

**Statement by Nauru on behalf of
the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)
AWG-KP Opening Contact Group
Bangkok, August 2012**

Mr. Chairman, Nauru has the honor to speak on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States, a grouping of 44 members most vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.

AOSIS aligns itself with the statement made by Algeria on behalf of the G77 and China, Swaziland on behalf of the African Group and with the statement to be delivered by The Gambia on behalf of the LDCs.

Madame Chair, the AWG-KP began its work in 2005. Almost seven years later, and in just three months' time, we will deliver the results of this work to the world. These results must be ambitious. They must be credible. They must inspire the confidence of the international community in our multilateral process. They must underscore the reverence we hold for the Kyoto Protocol. But what KP outcomes absolutely cannot be is window-dressing.

We cannot have a second commitment period that ignores the reality of climate change by endorsing a low level of ambition, or by papering over a lack of ambition with accounting tricks or conditionalities. We also cannot support a second commitment period that promises an increase in ambition at some unspecified future point in time, through an empty review process that cannot and will not deliver the necessary ambition.

When January 1, 2013 comes, every Annex B Party to the KP must hold clear, unequivocal and ambitious commitments and the international community must be convinced that these commitments will be delivered.

AOSIS shares the strongly-held view with other vulnerable countries that in Doha, we must adopt amendments that establish a five-year second commitment period to run from 2013 to 2017. These amendments must express ambitious, single number, unconditional QELROs, that are legally binding on Parties from 1 January 2013 forward, through the provisional application of these amendments pending their entry into force. There

must be no legal gap in the implementation of the Protocol, and no question about the implications of a gap for the operation of the Protocol's framework of accounting rules, institutions and flexibility mechanisms.

To achieve these outcomes, our work over the next week must address critical unresolved issues. These include:

- **First, ambition.** Many of the individual QELROs that Parties have brought forward are plainly inadequate and inconsistent with pathways to agreed global goals. More ambition is technically and economically feasible from all Annex I Parties. The EU's own internal studies have indicated that for the EU an increase in ambition to 30% is both cost-effective and desirable.

Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan can take far deeper reductions in view of their holdings of surplus units. AOSIS is waiting for **New Zealand and Australia** to present information on their QELROs at the earliest possible time, and looks forward to assurance of these countries' unequivocal commitment to taking meaningful second commitment period targets, here in Bangkok.

- **Second, commitment period length.** At this session we need to discuss the practical implications of the 5 and 8 year options for consistency with the ADP, the workings of our compliance system and the ability of our framework to respond to the evolving science with binding commitments. As AOSIS has repeatedly explained, subsequent commitment periods under the KP should continue to be 5 years in length, from a scientific, political and practical perspective.

This is integral to ambition. An 8-year CP would, as a practical matter, **lock in a level of ambition** that is inconsistent with emission trajectories needed to be in line with a limitation of temperature increases to below 1.5 degrees, or even well below 2 degrees – goals that all Parties have endorsed. An 8 year CP is also inconsistent with the timetable agreed under the ADP to begin a new agreement applicable to all, as AOSIS will further elaborate in the coming days.

- **Third, surplus Kyoto units.** The surplus of AAUs, CERs and ERUs is at such an enormous scale that it could completely negate the intended results of second commitment period emission reductions.

Yet, some Parties refuse to let go of surplus – even when they appear to have no intention of participating in a second commitment period or even when it is clear that these Parties will not need this surplus to achieve their second commitment period targets.

- **Fourth, eligibility to participate in the mechanisms.** AOSIS is of the firm view that there can be no access to the benefits of the Protocol's flexible mechanisms for any Kyoto Party that does not take binding second commitment QELROs and does not establish second commitment period assigned amount.
- **Fifth, the provisional application of amendments pending their entry into force.** This issue requires further focused discussion, as alternative proposals offer far less legal certainty.

Madam Chair,

Turning to the organisation of work at this session. We have some concerns with the approach laid out in the Chair's informal Note. These concerns relate to the topics chosen for spin-off groups and the need for open, transparent and meaningful discussion of all key issues, rather than a process of closed door, informal consultations to address some of the central issues on which decisions are needed for Doha.

We need to set aside formal time slots to address each of our critical issues and the implications and consequences through open and inclusive dialogues in which all Parties participate.

Madame Chair,

AOSIS looks forward to both very substantive and very productive discussions at this session and as always the members of AOSIS assure you of our full support.