



**Statement by Nauru on behalf of  
the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)  
AWG-KP Opening Plenary  
Bonn, May 15 2012**

Madame Chair, Nauru has the honor to speak on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States, a grouping of 43 members most vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.

Madame Chair, while we are now in the home-stretch of our negotiating process under the AWG-KP, the impacts of climate change are accelerating all around us.

Our central task here, in Bangkok and in Doha, must be to respond to these accelerating impacts with a level of mitigation ambition that rises to the enormity of the challenge we face.

We must conclude the work of the AWG-KP in Doha with the adoption of the Doha amendments that establish a five-year second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol to run from 2013 to 2017.

These amendments must express ambitious, unconditional emission reductions, and they must be legally binding on Parties from 1 January 2013 forward, through the provisional application of these amendments pending their entry into force.

This is necessary to ensure that there is no legal gap in the implementation of the Protocol, and no question about the implications of a gap for the operation of the Protocol's framework of accounting rules, institutions and flexibility mechanisms.

Madame Chair,

As you know, the vulnerable small island States have consistently supported a second commitment period that is 5 years in length.

This is an issue of crucial importance to us and other vulnerable Parties, and an issue that has received a great deal of attention. For this reason, I will take a few moments to lay out the necessity of such an approach.

- First, the ambition brought forward by Annex I Parties thus far is plainly inconsistent with an emission reductions trajectory needed to be in line with a limitation of temperature increases to below 1.5 degrees, or even well below 2 degrees. A 5-year commitment period is needed to avoiding locking-in for 8 years a level of ambition that all Parties in this room already know to be inconsistent with our long term goals
- A 5-year commitment period also preserves flexibility to respond, as we must, to the rapidly evolving science. A 5-year CP will enable the reflection of IPCC AR5 outcomes (that are due in 2014) at the soonest possible time (in other words, in 2018 at the end of a 2013-2017 commitment period, rather than in 2021 at the end of a 2013-2020 commitment period - when this information will already be outdated.
- A 5-year commitment period will also allow flexibility to respond to the falling costs of mitigation technology which is now making emission reductions more economically and technically feasible and indeed in our long-term economic interest.
- A 5-year commitment period has a clear mid-point (2015) which facilitates the calculation of QELROs
- A 5-year commitment period length is anticipated by the structure of the Kyoto Protocol itself, and continuing with this 5-year pattern will minimize the number of Marrakech Accord provisions that would need to be reopened
- A 5-year commitment period will enable the identification of countries in non-compliance far sooner than an 8-year commitment period, thereby allowing the necessary policy adjustments at the earliest possible time

- Finally Madame Chair, all Annex I Parties have acknowledged that they can present 5-year QELROs, and that commitment period length is essentially an issue of preference for many Parties, rather than a necessity.

Madame Chair, the adoption of a second set of legally-binding commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol is an essential part of the Durban package and we must deliver on this package.

Accordingly, Madame Chair, we see **five** broad issues that require our attention between now and Doha.

**First, we must work on raising the ambition of proposed QELROs and proposed commitments of all Annex I Parties.** More ambition is technically and economically feasible from all Annex I Parties. The EU is able to meet and exceed the top of its pledged 30% range, as many studies have shown.

In fact, an increase in mitigation ambition has been shown to be actually in the EU's own best interests, as a whole and at the member State level. It is not clear to small island States why, in this context, a 5-year QELRO consistent with a greater level of ambition cannot be brought forward.

New Zealand and Australia will hold substantial surpluses of Kyoto units in the first commitment period which enable these Parties to step up their unconditional mitigation effort.

New Zealand can readily move to a level of ambition consistent with a 20% reduction by 2020, and Australia can surely do more. Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan will need to bring forward far deeper second commitment period reductions to avoid maintaining and generating vast amount of hot air.

With respect to those non-Kyoto Parties, and Parties that have indicated that they will not bring forward commitments under the Kyoto Protocol -- the United States, Canada, Russia and Japan -- AOSIS wants to emphasize that the mitigation efforts of these Parties will not avoid scrutiny.

Far from it. We will shine an even brighter spotlight on these countries, who will have to go further to demonstrate that their efforts are comparable to those of Kyoto Parties and that their efforts will achieve results consistent with what the best available science requires.

The failure to take a quantified target is not a license not to act and cannot be, because the actions of all Parties on mitigation, affect all of us.

AOSIS has presented options and ways to increase mitigation ambition pre-2020, and the endorsement of some of these initiatives should enable all Parties to bring forward more ambitious targets by the end of this year.

**Second, Madame Chair, between now and Doha we see room to work on rules for the translation of pledges to QELROs that move Parties to higher levels of ambition and preserve the environmental integrity of the Protocol.** AOSIS has made a submission on Annex I Party QELROs, which is found in document MISC.1/ Add.1.

In this submission, we propose a rule set for translating pledges to QELROs that aims to ensure higher levels of ambition and environmental integrity, we calculate 5 year QELROs for each Party based on this rule set, and we highlight where individual Parties have room to increase their ambition now. We look forward to the opportunity to discuss such a rule set at this session.

**Third, Madame Chair, between now and Doha we must work to develop a solution to the issue of surplus AAUs.** This is an issue that threatens to undermine the effective emission reductions that the atmosphere will see from the commitments ultimately adopted for the second commitment period. AOSIS has presented options for addressing this issue.

**Fourth, Madame Chair, between now and Doha we need to revisit the form of proposed Annex B and other proposed amendment text.** The KP is not an appropriate place to lodge conditional commitments. The KP is also not the place to endorse ranges of possible ambition to provide political cover to individual Parties that may not have the courage to admit to small island States, LDCs and other vulnerable countries that they are unwilling to commit to a level of ambition consistent with long term survival.

No, the Kyoto Protocol is the place to adopt clear, unambiguous, unconditional emission reduction commitments that the public can readily understand and on which the international carbon market can rely. We have further work to do to achieve this clarity.

**Fifth, Madame Chair, between now and Doha we need to confirm a process and agree text to ensure the provisional application of adopted amendments pending their entry into force under the normal ratification process.**

This is essential if we are to ensure no gap in the legal nature of Kyoto Protocol commitments for Parties. This may not be some Parties' politically preferred approach, but it is essential to guarantee legally binding commitments of Parties at the earliest possible time.

Madame Chair, AOSIS assures you of its strong support in addressing the issues we have highlighted, and in bringing the work of the AWG-KP to a successful conclusion in Doha.

I thank you Chair.